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Introduction

Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution expressly grants Congress the power of the purse:
“No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of Appropriations made by
law.” 1 The Constitution requires no more, and Congress under its discretion has formalized, to
some degree, the modern appropriations process by establishing internal rules in the House and
Senate and, in some cases, by statute. 2 These congressional rules have evolved since the first
Congress to reflect power struggles between various congressional committees and Members and
between the Legislative Branch and the Executive Branch. Today, Congress fulfills its Article I,
Section 9 obligation through a yearly appropriations cycle shepherded by the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees. In theory at least, the role of the appropriators is limited to
providing annual funding allocations for all discretionary programs through the enactment of
twelve yearly appropriations bills.

Before yearly spending bills can be enacted, House and Senate rules provide for an
elaborate and complex budgetary process that contemplates submittal by the President of a
yearly budget proposal, congressional approval of a budget resolution, as well as a bifurcated

1

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. For a scholarly discussion of the constitutional contours of Congress’ obligation in
appropriating funds see generally Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 Yale. L.J. 1343 (1988).
2
See House Rule XXI, Senate Rule XVI, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub.L.
No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297, 2 U.S.C. § 601–688.
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authorization-appropriation process. 3 These rules recognize that power struggles in Congress
often encumber legislative action and the rules are thus sufficiently flexible that they may be
circumvented with relative ease. Most of the budgetary rules are not self-enforcing requiring
Members of Congress to actively invoke them through a point of order. 4 In addition, they may
easily be waived at any point during the budgetary process. 5 Within this malleable budgetary
framework, the distinction between authorizing legislation and appropriations has become
blurred in recent years with appropriations legislation and appropriations committees
encroaching on, and in some cases, dominating the policymaking and legislative spheres once
occupied by authorizing committees. 6 The shift in power from authorizing legislation to
appropriations legislation has serious procedural and substantive implications for the kind of
deliberative democracy the Constitution contemplates.

This paper takes a closer look at the theoretical distinction between authorizations and
appropriations in the context of recent Congresses. Part I describes current rules that govern or,
at least, should govern the authorization-appropriations process. In addition, Part I reviews the
historical underpinnings for the distinction with particular emphasis on the conflicts within
Congress that have shaped the evolution of authorizing and appropriations committees. Part II
identifies the repercussions of the increasing influence of appropriators in the arena of legislative
3

See generally ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET, THIRD EDITION: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS (2007).
As an example, Rule XVI(1) of the Standing Rules of the Senate makes enforcement of Senate rules contingent on
the formal raising of an objection by a Member, “On a point of order made by any Senator, no amendments shall be
received to any general appropriation bill the effect of which will be to increase an appropriation already contained
in the bill, or to add a new item of appropriation…” Senate Rule XVI(1).
5
Most notably, in the House of Representatives, the Committee on Rules can by majority vote adopt a special rule
that waives all points of order. A special rule supersedes the standing rules of the House in the application of the
measure named in the rule. See Committee On Rules, House of Representatives. Legislative Process Program,
available at: http://www.rules.house.gov/POP/specialrule_func.htm (last accessed on April 19, 2009).
6
See Mark Champoux and Dan Sullivan, Briefing Paper No. 15, Authorizations and Appropriations: A Distinction
without a Difference (May, 10, 2006) (available at: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/auth_appro_15.pdf
- prepared for the Harvard Law School Federal Budget Policy Seminar).
4
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and policy making decisions at the expensive of authorizing committees. Part III describes and
evaluates a few recent proposals to reform the authorizing-appropriations process. This paper
concludes with a discussion of possible recommendations for reform.

I. The Authorization-Appropriation Distinction

A. Definitions and Congressional Rules

Authorization measures are perhaps best understood for what they do not accomplish.
Authorizations, by definition, do not obligate federal funds. They can however establish the
parameters of particular spending programs by creating, continuing, or modifying agencies or
programs. 7 Authorizations also can authorize appropriations for specific programs and federal
agencies by setting non-binding spending targets for appropriators on a permanent, annual, or
multi-year timetable. 8 Generally when authorizations expire, they should be renewed.
Authorization measures fall under the jurisdiction of most congressional committees including
the House Committees on the Judiciary and Homeland Security, or the Senate Committees on
Armed Services. 9 Some of these authorizing committees may also provide budget resources
through direct spending legislation, most notably in the area of entitlements. 10 For example, the
House Ways and Means Committee and the House Energy and Commerce Committee share joint

7

See generally ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET, THIRD EDITION: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS (2007);
Congressional Research Service, The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction (Updated February
22, 2007).
8
Id.at 24.
9
Id. The United States Senate has 17 standing committees of which, in general terms, 15 have jurisdiction over
authorizing legislation. The House has 20 standing committees of which 17 have jurisdiction over authorizations.
The appropriations and budget committees in both chambers generally do not consider authorizing legislation. In
addition, the House Rules Committee serves as the gatekeeper for House floor proceedings.
10
Id.
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jurisdiction over the Medicare program. 11 These committees, by making programmatic changes
to the Medicare program, control Medicare obligations incurred by federal agencies. 12

The congressional rules enforcing the authorization-appropriation distinction are
designed to bifurcate these functions by separating committee jurisdiction over authorization and
appropriations bills. Through House and Senate internal rules, Congress generally prohibits
language in appropriations bills providing unauthorized appropriations or legislation on an
appropriations bill. 13 The Congressional Research Service defines “unauthorized appropriation”
as “new budget authority in an appropriations measure…for agencies or programs whose
authorization has expired or was never authorized, or whose budget authority exceeds the ceiling
authorized.” 14 “Legislation” is broadly interpreted to include “language in appropriations
measures that change existing law, such as establishing new law, or amending or repealing
current law. Legislation is under the jurisdiction of the authorizing committees.” 15

In the House of Representatives, Rule XXI governs the distinction between
authorizations and appropriations. It prohibits unauthorized appropriations and legislation in
regular appropriations bills and supplemental appropriations measures. 16 However, the full
scope of the rule is narrowed by many exceptions. Rule XXI only applies to general
appropriations bills – bills that provide funds for more than one purpose or agency – but do not
apply to continuing resolutions. 17 Moreover, the House prohibition only applies to bills once
11

Id. at 17.
Id.
13
See House Rule XXI, Senate Rule XVI.
14
Congressional Research Service, supra note 6, at 24.
15
Id. at 24-25
16
Rules of the House of Representatives, 111th Congress, Rule XXI Clause 2(a)(1), Rule XXI Clause 5 (2009).
17
Id.
12
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they are reported by the House Appropriations Committee, amendments to those bills, and
conference reports. 18 In practice, Rule XXI is frequently waived by the House Rules Committee
which may adopt a special rule waiving the Rule prior to floor consideration of the
appropriations bill or the appropriations conference report. 19 The point of order does not apply to
the committee report or the joint explanatory statement that accompanies the appropriations bill
text. 20

The Senate rules on unauthorized appropriations and legislation operate differently than
their House counterparts. 21 Rule XVI has greater applicability covering general appropriations
bills defined in the Senate to include regular appropriations bills, supplemental appropriations,
and continuing resolutions. 22 However, the Senate rule applies only to amendments to general
appropriations bills, bills reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee or to the House
passed measure. 23 The rule does not apply to provisions in Senate bills or conference reports. 24
With respect to unauthorized appropriations, Senate appropriations may only be provided for
authorizations previously passed by the Senate in the same legislative session. 25 The House rules
require that the authorization be in law. 26 Although the Senate rule generally prohibits
unauthorized appropriations in non-committee amendments, Senators rarely raise this point of
order because there are a myriad of exceptions to the rule. 27 The Senate rules also prohibit

18

Congressional Research Service, supra note 6 at 25.
Id.
20
Id.
21
See Standing Rules of the Senate, Rule XVI (2009).
22
Id. at Rule XVI, clause 1.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Rules of the House of Representatives, 111th Congress, Rule XXI Clause 2(a)(1), Rule XXI Clause 5 (2009).
19
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legislative amendments and non-germane amendments during consideration by the Senate
Appropriations Committee or on the Senate floor. 28

Although as a formal matter, these rules create a jurisdictional barrier between
appropriations and authorization committees, the distinction is largely illusory. In both the
Senate and House, the rules are not self-enforcing. Unless a Member raises a point of order, the
provision is likely to become law. In addition, the House of Representatives, through its Rules
Committee can and frequently does report a rule which waives all points of order. As a practical
matter, unauthorized appropriations and legislative riders are frequently included in
appropriations bills and generally available for obligation or expenditure.

B. Historical Roots of Authorizations

While the Constitution grants Congress the power of the purse, it is left to Congress to
decide through internal procedures how federal funding will be appropriated. Today’s
authorization and appropriations process represents the evolution of over two centuries of
congressional procedure and practice established as a result of turf battles between Members of
Congress and between congressional committees. During early congressional sessions, the
House Ways and Means Committee was generally responsible for reporting both appropriations
and tax measures while the Senate Finance Committee performed the same functions in the
Senate. 29 During these early years, the rules and traditions governing the Congressional

28

Senate Rule XVI, clause 1.
See KENNON, DONALD R. AND ROGERS, REBECCA M., COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS (UNITED STATES HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES): A BICENTENNIAL HISTORY, 1789-1989, p. 55 (1989).
29
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appropriations process were shaped in large measure as a response to emerging conflicts between
the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch.

The first appropriations bill providing all funding for the national government was
enacted in 1789. 30 The legislation totaled a mere thirteen lines and included four lump sums
specifically requested by the Executive branch for federal government operations: “$216,000 for
the civil list, $137,000 for the War Department, $190,000 to discharge warrants issued by the
previous Board of Treasury, and $96,000 for pensions to disabled veterans.” 31 No authorization
for the appropriations was provided or even contemplated. The House passed the bill without
Committee consideration or referral. 32 The Senate approved the measure with little fanfare a few
hours after it was reported out of a committee temporarily established to review the legislation. 33

Beginning in 1791 and in response to increasingly strained relationship between
Congress and Treasury Secretary Hamilton, legislators successfully narrowed Executive
discretion using a “that is to say” clause in its appropriations bills – “that is to say, $102,686 for
pay of troops, $48,000 for clothing, etc…” 34 By 1794, the House began using the Ways and
Means Committee in conjunction with other committees for appropriations until 1802 when the
Committee was given permanent status as a standing committee charged with annual

30

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1789-1994, p. 206 (1994)
(printed under the direction of the House Committee on Administration).
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 207
34
In fact, the House of Representatives considered a House resolution in 1793 accusing Hamilton of violating
appropriations law, ignoring Presidential instructions, failing to discharge essential duties, and committing an
indecorum against the House of Representatives. The charges were eventually dismissed. HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1789-1994, p. 207

8

appropriations. 35 The Senate continued its practice of assigning spending measures to select
committees until 1816 when the Senate Finance Committee was established as a standing
committee with jurisdiction over spending and revenue measures. 36 Spurred by Republicans, the
party of Thomas Jefferson, the early Congresses tended to mistrust the committee system,
particularly in the appropriations process. 37 It was thought that spending levels should be
decided by the entire House of Representatives rather than by a select group of committee
members. 38 During the first Congresses, the budget process was far simpler than it is today with
no formal distinction made between authorization and appropriation. In fact, given the limited
size of the federal government and the relative size of the federal budget, there seemed to be little
need or appetite for such distinctions.

In 1837, the House adopted a rule prohibiting appropriations in a general appropriation
bill not previously authorized by law. 39 Congress sought to prevent the possibility of delays in
enacting appropriation bills because of legislative proposals contained in the bill. 40 In 1865 and
1867, under pressure to finance the Civil War, the House Appropriations Committee was
established with jurisdiction over general appropriation bills transferred from the Ways and
Means Committee. 41 Two years after, the Senate adopted the same reform. 42 Proponents of the
change cited the increasing workload of the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate

35

See KENNON, DONALD R. AND ROGERS, REBECCA M., COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS (UNITED STATES HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES): a Bicentennial History, 1789-1989.
36
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1789-1994, p. 208 (1989) pp. 193-194.
37

Id.
Id.
39
Id. at 210.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 211.
42
Id.
38
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Finance Committee in handling both appropriations and revenue legislation. 43 In fact, before the
Civil War, yearly federal appropriations increased from approximately $70 million annually to
$800 million during the Civil War. 44

With the establishment of the appropriations committees, certain Members became
critical of the increasing power of appropriators and sought to limit the inclusion of riders or
authorizing language in appropriations bills. Debate over the Holman Rule exemplified the
power struggle between appropriators and non-appropriators by defining the precise contours of
the appropriations committee jurisdictional boundaries. 45 Allen Schick identifies two more
reasons for the post-Civil War emphasis on separating appropriations from authorization. 46 One
was concern that disputes over policy and legislation would impede the flow of funds to federal
agencies. 47 The other was “that the urgency of funding ongoing agencies would impel Congress
to enact ill-considered legislation in appropriations bills.” 48

As the conflict between appropriators and authorizers escalated, the House and Senate
adopted in the late 19th century a plan to consolidate the appropriation and authorization
functions of specified programs by transferring jurisdiction over several general appropriations
43

Id.
Id.
45
“In 1838 that Congress added the exception to permit unauthorized appropriations for continuation of works in
progress and for contingencies for carrying on departments of the Government. The rule remained in that form until
the 44th Congress in 1876, when William S. Holman of Indiana persuaded the House to amend the rule to permit
germane legislative retrenchments. In 1880, the 46th Congress dropped the exception which permitted unauthorized
appropriations for contingencies of Government departments, and modified the ``Holman Rule'' to define
retrenchments as the reduction of the number and salary of officers of the United States, the reduction of
compensation of any person paid out of the Treasury of the United States, or the reduction of the amounts of money
covered by the bill. That form of the retrenchment exception…[i]t was [ ] dropped in the 54th Congress from 1895
until reinserted in the 62d Congress in 1911 (IV, 3578; VII, 1125).” Government Printing Office, 106th Congress
House Rules Manual, House Document No. 106-320 (1999).
46
ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET, THIRD EDITION: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS (2007).
47
Id.
48
Id.
44
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bills from the Senate and House Appropriations Committees to various authorization
committees. 49 By consolidating jurisdiction over appropriations bills among several
authorization committees, control over overall Federal spending was decentralized and
appropriators were left with only a portion of yearly appropriations bills. The House
fragmentation lasted approximately 35 years, until all general appropriations bills were recentralized in the House Appropriations Committee in 1920, while in the Senate jurisdiction over
all general appropriations was returned to the jurisdiction of the Senate Appropriations
Committee in 1922. 50

Congress again sought to reform the appropriations process in response to the dramatic
increase in expenditures and the national debt as a result of World War I. Federal expenditures
rose from about $700 million before World War I to $12.7 billion and $18.5 billion during 1918
and 1919. 51 Congress passed the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, which established the
Bureau of the Budget (later reorganized as the Office of Management and Budget) and gave the
President the responsibility for preparing and submitting the annual budget to Congress. 52 The
decentralized appropriations process, with certain committees vested with authorization as well
as appropriations functions, was partly blamed for the significant increase in federal
expenditures. 53 The balance of power had shifted back to appropriators and would never
significantly swing back to the authorizers.

49

Congressional Research Service, Consolidating Intelligence Appropriation and Authorization in a Single
Committee: 9/11 Commission Recommendation and Alternatives, p. 8 (2004) (The report provides a summary of
House and Senate efforts to consolidate appropriations and authorization functions in single committees).
50
Id.
51
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1789-1994, p. 220.
52
Id.
53
Id.
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Fragmentation of committee jurisdiction over spending exists today. Currently, most
spending is controlled by the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Committees in the
form of entitlement programs. Examples of entitlement programs include Social Security,
Medicare, unemployment compensation, and various veterans benefit programs. For Federal
Fiscal Year (“FFY”) 2008, approximately 57% of all FY2009 spending took the form of
entitlements and nearly 40% fell under the jurisdiction of the appropriations committees. 54

II. Unbalanced Power – Authorizing on Appropriations Legislation

Congress ostensibly recognizes the benefits of a bifurcated authorization-appropriations
framework declaring that, “all programs that are taxpayer-financed should be subject to periodic
review through the authorization process” which serves as “an effective vehicle for
systematically reviewing agency goals, assessing performance, eliminating or duplicative
function, and making such changes in program design as are necessary.” 55 The rules of the
House and Senate as well as the committee system and its division of responsibilities formalize
this distinction. In practice, however, appropriators have increasingly consolidated
appropriations and authorization functions encroaching on jurisdictional territory that should, at
least as a formal matter, be reserved to the authorizing committees.

As a result, appropriations bills are usually laden with funding for programs that have not
been authorized and with language that does much more than provide for or explicate funding
54

Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2009 to 2019 (January, 2009) p.
16 (Table 5 estimates that mandatory spending for FY 2008 totaled nearly $1.6 trillion while discretionary spending
accounted for slightly more than $1.3 trillion of the overall federal budget).
55
Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives, Report on the Comprehensive Budget Process Reform Act of
1990, Report to accompany H.R. 853 (1999), pp. 51-52.
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allocations. By using appropriations bills as vehicles to enact legislation or unauthorized
appropriations, sound thorough deliberative policy making suffers. Unlike their authorizing
counterparts, appropriators often bypass the hearing and open debate procedures when
considering non-appropriations matters. Legislative riders and unauthorized appropriations are
inserted into the legislative text behind closed doors without formal debate. In addition,
appropriators frequently use Committee Reports to make substantive policy and legislative
changes. These reports are largely not open to amendment or even debatable during committee
consideration. One commentator has accurately noted that the appropriations process is used to
“accomplish substantive objectives that have not been considered previously or that contravene
established statutory objectives …[preventing] the appropriate authorizing committee from
applying its expertise. Exacerbating this problem, appropriations are often acted on quickly,
providing little opportunity for thoughtful deliberation of the issues raised by such
deliberations.” 56 The encroachment by appropriators in areas reserved under congressional rules
to authorizers takes different forms, each with its own consequences for the deliberative process.

A. Unauthorized Appropriations

The practice of using appropriations to fund unauthorized appropriations encroaches on
jurisdictional territory reserved to authorizers, renders the work of authorizers duplicative or
superfluous, and aggrandizes the power of Appropriations Subcommittee Chairmen. The
Prescription Drug Monitoring Program provides a good, albeit small, example. Every year since
FY 2002, Congress has appropriated funds for a Prescription Drug Monitoring Program that

56

Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987 Duke L.J. 456, p. 458
(June, 1987).
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provides grants to states “to assist States in building or enhancing prescription drug monitoring
systems, facilitating the exchange of information among States, and providing technical
assistance and training on establishing and operating effective prescription drug monitoring
programs.” 57 In Fiscal Year 2009, the program received an appropriation of $7 million codified
through brief legislative language: “$7,000,000 for a prescription drug monitoring program.” 58
The Judiciary Committee failed to authorize the program when it considered a Department of
Justice reauthorization bill in 2005 which covered similar law enforcement programs. 59 Only the
Appropriations bill’s report language appears to serve as an informal authorization: “The bill
includes $7,000,000 for the Prescription Drug Monitoring Program…the OJP [Office of Justice
Programs] is expected to work with the DEA [Drug Enforcement Agency] to implement this
program.” 60 It should be noted that the program’s formal title is the Harold Rogers Prescription
Monitoring Program named after the Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee with
jurisdiction over Department of Justice funding in 2002 when the program was created.

The Appropriations Committees typically fund numerous other programs that either have
never previously been authorized or whose authorization has expired. The Congressional Budget
Office (“CBO”), pursuant to statute, issues an annual report to Congress listing all programs and
activities for the most recent fiscal year for which authorizations of appropriations have expired
57

House Report 107-278, Title II – State and Local Law Enforcement Assistiance (2001) (Report accompanying the
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub.
L. 107-77 (2001)). See also, Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Harold Rogers Prescription Drug
Monitoring Program: Overview (2009) (available at: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/prescripdrugs.html).
58
Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. 111-8, Div. B, Title II, State and Local Law Enforcement Activities
(2009).
59
Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-162 (2006) (The
bill included reauthorization for a large number of state and local government law enforcement activities including
the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant program and the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program.
Of note, funding under these programs can be used by states to establish prescription drug monitoring programs).
60
Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Committee Print of the House Committee on Appropriations on H.R. 1105,
Div. B, Title II, State and Local Government Activities.

14

or will expire during the current fiscal year. 61 A CBO report concluded that in Fiscal Year 2008,
Congress had appropriated approximately $160 billion in unauthorized grants. 62 The majority of
these unauthorized appropriations were for programs that fall under the jurisdiction of the
Committees on Armed Services, Transportation and Infrastructure, and Judiciary. 63 While total
funding for unauthorized programs represents only a small share of total yearly discretionary
spending, the practice of including appropriations for activities that have never been fully vetted
or have been rejected by authorizers raises a number of troubling questions. The result is a
process that leaves authorizers with little substantive and meaningful input in the overall
appropriations process. Whether an authorizing committee decides to establish or abolish a
federal program becomes meaningless, since their decisions can and are often overridden as
appropriations bills move through the Federal budget process.

B. Legislating in Appropriations Bills

Purely legislative topics, that have little bearing on the appropriations process, can
become the focal point of intense debate over annual spending measures. These policy riders,
tucked into the legislative text of an appropriations bill, often have only a tangential relationship
to the programs or appropriations under the jurisdiction of the Appropriations Committee. They
are, in essence, policy matters better suited for debate within the sphere of the authorizing
committees. Not only do these policy riders encroach on the jurisdiction of authorizing

61

Congressional Budget Office, Unauthorized Appropriations and Expiring Authorizations (2009). The
Congressional Budget Office is required by section 202(e)(3) of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974 to submit a report to Congress annually outlining programs that need to be authorized or
reauthorized before the appropriations process begins.
62
Id. at 2.
63
Id. at 4, Table 1.
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committees, they can have serious consequences for the proper and timely enactment of
appropriations legislation.

The Hyde Amendment, named after its sponsor, an appropriator at the time, is perhaps
the best known legislative rider. 64 The Hyde Amendment barred the use of federal funds to pay
for abortions and represented the first major legislative victory by opponents of the Supreme
Court’s abortion decisions. 65 On its face, the Hyde Amendment appeared to fall within the
purview of annual appropriations bills. Rather than authorizing a new program or changing
existing multi-year laws, the amendment sought to narrow the use of spending allocations by
prohibiting the obligation of funds for certain specific purposes. While designed as purely a
“limitation rider,” the Hyde Amendment was more than just a limitation. Enacted in 1976, as an
anti-abortion response to Roe v. Wade, the amendment sought to alter the abortion debate
landscape and counter decisions made by the Judiciary branch. 66

The first two attempts to insert the Hyde Amendment into the 1977 Labor, Health,
Education and Welfare appropriations bill were struck down as improper legislating on an
appropriations bill. 67 Responding to a point of order under Rule XXI, the House chair ruled that
the amendment either interfered with executive branch discretion in carrying out authorized
functions or that it required officials to make judgments not at the time required by law. 68 On

64

See Congressional Research Service, Abortion Legislative Response (July 29, 2003). For different historical
perspectives on the Hyde Amendment, see National Committee for a Human Life Amendment, The Hyde
Amendment (April, 2008) (available: http://www.nchla.org/datasource/ifactsheets/4FSHydeAm22a.08.pdf); The
American Civil Liberties Union, Public Funding for Abortion: What is the Hyde Amendment? (2004) (available at:
http://www.aclu.org/reproductiverights/lowincome/16393res20040721.html).
65
Id.
66
See generally id. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
67
WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS, THIRD EDITION (1989), p. 54.
68
Id.
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the third attempt, Hyde Amendment supporters succeeded by submitting simple language that
omitted any reference to current law or to agency discretion, “[n]one of the funds appropriated
under this Act shall be used to pay for abortions or to promote or encourage abortions.” 69

Since 1977, the Hyde Amendment and similar abortion-related appropriations have
increased and rendered the Labor, Health and Education appropriations measure the most
contentious and difficult appropriations bill to enact, even though the bill should be largely noncontroversial with respect to pure funding matters. In 1995, the Hyde amendment and similar
policy riders contributed to the government shut-down. 70 Under Republican leadership, the
House of Representatives decided to use the appropriations process to enact its agenda. 71
Numerous riders were attached to spending bills. In addition to a modified stepped-up version of
the Hyde Amendment, the FY 1996 Labor HHS appropriations bill included language limiting
the enforcement powers of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and a proposal to
overturn an executive order issued by President Clinton that barred federal contractors from
permanently replacing striking workers. 72 These policy riders, in addition to proposed overall
cuts in discretionary spending levels, became the focal point of conflict between President
Clinton and the Republican Congress and eventually resulted in the government shutdowns of
1995 and early 1996. 73

69

Id.
John H. Aldrich and David W. Rohde, The Republican Revolution and the House Appropriations Committee, The
Journal of Politics, Vol. 62, No. 1 (2000), pp. 15-16.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
70
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In addition to bogging down the annual appropriations process, debates over policy riders
are not well served in the context of the appropriations process. Appropriators do not have the
expertise in substance policy subject matters that their authorizing counterparts have. Moreover,
policy riders are usually inserted into appropriations bills by senior members of the committee
with little opportunity for hearings and thorough analysis. Authorizing committees, given their
special expertise in legislative and statutory policy matters are better equipped to take on a
thorough examination of subject matters that deserve more thoughtful consideration than thirty
minutes on the House floor.

C. Authorizations Disguised as Appropriations Report Language

Appropriations legislation is almost always accompanied by report language designed to
explain the appropriations bill. 74 Report language is non-binding and does not carry the force of
law. However, Executive Branch agencies treat report language as the equivalent of law for fear
of the consequences of disobeying directives issued by the appropriators. 75 Report language
accompanying appropriations bills has grown exponentially in recent decades as Members of the
appropriations committee have sought to accomplish their policy objectives without running
afoul of House and Senate Rules which govern appropriations bills but generally do not apply to
report language.

74

Sandy Streeter, Congressional Research Service, Appropriations Bills: What is Report Language?, (updated
January 25, 2007) (discussing the role of report language in the appropriations process, “[b]oth report language and
managers’ statements generally include detailed spending instructions, directives, and, sometimes, spending
restrictions.”).
75
Id. at 2 (finding that with respect to appropriations report language “executive branch agencies take them
seriously because they must justify their budget requests annually to the Appropriations Committees.”
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While report language should be limited to clarifying or explicating the legislative text,
reports accompanying appropriations bills do much more. The recently enacted FY 2009
Omnibus Appropriations bill provides numerous examples of legislative or authorizing mandates
effectively disguised as report language. 76 For example, the Joint Explanatory Report for the FY
2009 Omnibus Appropriations bill directs FEMA to issue regulations requiring states to include
Emergency Medical Service in their homeland security grant applications. 77 Report language is
included urging the Office of Personnel Management to “consider” federal health benefits for
same-sex domestic partners of federal employees. 78 Another provision requires the National
Marine Fisheries Service to participate in the restoration of the San Joaquin River Restoration
Settlement pursuant to a Federal court order.79 While none of these provisions have the force of
law, federal agency officials are compelled to comply with recommendations imposed by those
in Congress who control their annual budgets.

At its worst, report language can effectively preempt thoughtful and comprehensive
consideration of entire subject areas. Professor Richard Lazarus of Georgetown Law recently
studied the increasing use of appropriations report language in the context of environmental
policy since the 1980s concluding that “when Congress does exercise its lawmaking authorities
to influence environmental protection policy, it does so primarily through the appropriations
process: the sphere of its responsibility that, ironically, has proven to be the least conducive to
the kind of deliberative democracy that justifies legislative supremacy in environmental

76

Joint Explanatory Report for the FY 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 111-8 (2009) (available on the
House Appropriations Committee website at: http://appropriations.house.gov/FY2009_consolidated.shtml).
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.

19

lawmaking.” 80 In fact, report language is rarely debated in open committee meetings and does
not garner the public scrutiny that authorizing legislation is subject to. Committee reports are
usually drafted behind closed doors by the Chairman of the appropriations subcommittee with
jurisdiction. It is not subject to amendment either at the Committee level or on the House or
Senate floor. Professor Lazarus is left to conclude that: “[p]aralysis of the congressional
authorization committees has created opportunities, often fueled by perverse political incentives,
for those hoping to effectuate legal change through nondeliberative, back-door, private dealmaking in appropriations legislation.” 81

D. Earmarks – Public Perception

The importance of report language in the appropriations process is perhaps best
understood, at least in the public eye, in the context of earmarks. According to one Member of
Congress, it is estimated that in one recent year 96 percent of earmarks were contained in
conference reports or committee reports rather than in the appropriations text itself. 82 Although
there is no formal agreed upon definition of “earmarks,” OMB defines earmarks as “funds
provided by the Congress for projects or programs where the congressional direction (in bill or
report language) circumvents Executive Branch merit-based or competitive allocation processes,
or specifies the location or recipient, or otherwise curtails the ability of the Executive Branch to
manage critical aspects of the funds allocation process.” 83 Citizens Against Government Waste
takes a broader view defining an earmark as, “any expenditure for a specific purpose that is
80
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tucked into a larger bill.” 84 As a practical matter, earmarks have little impact on the overall
Federal budget. In Fiscal Year 2008, there were over 11 thousand earmarks accounting for $16.5
billion according to OMB, representing a fairly small share of the approximate total of $3 trillion
budget for that year. 85

The proliferation of earmarks, however, has become a lightning rod for critics of the
appropriations process. One Senator recently noted that between 1994 and 2005 earmarks
increased from under 2,000 to 14,000. 86 Fueling the criticism, most earmarks are not authorized
or publicly debated. They are usually inserted into non-binding reports accompanying the text of
appropriations bills and therefore cannot be amended. Historically, they are not available for
public viewing until after one chamber of Congress or the other has passed its version of the
appropriations measure. Once they do become public, critics relish the opportunity to find
particularly offensive earmarks. Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK), a fervent opponent of earmarks
recently highlighted some questionable earmarks: “$1.9 million for the Pleasure Beach water taxi
service in Connecticut, $300,000 to commemorate the 150th anniversary of John Brown's raid on
the arsenal at Harpers Ferry National Historical Park in West Virginia and $238,000 for the
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Polynesian Voyaging Society of Honolulu, which runs sea voyages in ancient-style sailing
canoes.” 87

The public perception is that earmarks, lobbyists, appropriators and campaign
contributions are inextricably linked. 88 The high-profile indictments and convictions of Senator
Ted Stevens (R-AK) and Representative Randall “Duke” Cunningham (R-CA) have led to
greater scrutiny of not just earmarks but of the entire appropriations process, including
reinvigorating the role of authorizers. 89 As a result, modest reforms to the appropriations
process and the earmark process appear on the rise. 90

E. The Role of Cardinals –Power in the Hands of a Select Few

In both the Senate and the House of Representatives, the Chairmen of the Appropriations
Committees and the Committees’ various subcommittees hold particular sway over the
appropriations process. The appropriations process begins with them, and it often ends with
them. An appropriations subcommittee chairman, also known as a “cardinal”, provides the first
draft of the appropriations bill under his or her jurisdiction. It is usually circulated to other
committee members a day or two before subcommittee consideration. By the time it reaches the
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floor of the House and Senate, a week perhaps two weeks later, few Members have had the
opportunity to parse through and fully digest both the bill and the important report that
accompanies it.

The subcommittee chairs are charged with shepherding the bill through the
appropriations process before it leaves the chamber bound for a Senate-House Conference. At
each stage, the “cardinal” exerts his or her influence, using political savvy and direct or indirect
threats of funding reductions, to ensure that the underlying bill passes the chamber relatively
unscathed. Each of the eleven appropriations bills contain programs, directives and earmarks
that provide targeted financial assistance to every congressional district and state. Because
appropriations bills have grown so large in scope, appropriators can easily resist serious
challenges to the bill by implicit threats to withhold funding from congressional districts whose
representatives might dare to challenge the cardinal.

Cardinals also flex their muscle in the face of Executive Branch challenges. House
Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Jamie Whitten headed the Agriculture Appropriations
Subcommittee for nearly forty years and held particular sway over the activities of the
Agriculture Department. 91 During the late 1980s, he and the Department disagreed over funding
levels for soil conservation programs. 92 Congressman Whitten sought higher appropriations for
soil conservation, but the Department favored curtailing the program. 93 To show his displeasure
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with the Department, Whitten successfully, through the appropriations process, abolished the job
of his chief rival in the Department who at the time was Assistant Secretary for conservation
programs. 94

III. Proposals to Reform the Authorization/Appropriation Process

In the past twenty years, numerous reform proposals have been introduced to combat the
growing influence of appropriators, slow the growth of discretionary spending and establish a
clear distinction between the appropriations and authorization process. These reforms, often
taking the form of bold changes to statute or internal congressional rules, have floundered in the
face of strong resistance from appropriators unwilling to cede power in the budget process. A
few noteworthy reforms are described below.

Since the late 1980s, attempts have been made to fundamentally change the
appropriations process with the introduction of legislation establishing a biennial budget cycle. 95
Biennial budgeting would change the cycle under which Congress acts on budget resolutions and
appropriations acts to from one year to two years. 96 Supporters contend that a biennial budget
would limit the amount of time Congress spends on appropriations and budgetary matters and
facilitate more thorough oversight of federal agencies and programs and lead to a more
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substantive role for authorizers. 97 In practice, however, it is unlikely that biennial budgeting
would accomplish these substantive objectives, particularly in light of Congress’ recent appetite
for enacting Supplemental Appropriations bills. 98 Congress and appropriators are more likely to
use non-appropriations years to debate and eventually enact a myriad of supplemental
appropriations.

In the 1980s, Senators Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS) and Daniel Inouye (D-HA) introduced
a bold concept to rectify the imbalance of power between appropriators and authorizers –
combine the authorizing and appropriators into single committees established by subject
matter. 99 Under this proposal, committees that currently only perform authorizing functions
would handle both appropriations and authorizing legislation falling under their jurisdiction. 100
The Judiciary Committee, for example, would handle programmatic and oversight functions as
well as annual appropriations for programs administered by the Department of Justice. The
House and Senate Homeland Security Committee would serve dual functions for homeland
security. In essence, the appropriations committees would be abolished, replaced by a system
that diffuses power over spending within the committee system to nearly every Member of
Congress.
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Proposals to eradicate the jurisdictional distinction between appropriations and
authorizations have been raised in other contexts. Most recently, the 9/11 Commission adopted a
recommendations proposing to merge the authorization and appropriations functions for
intelligence programs into a single committee. 101 Critics have argued that such proposals would
increase discretionary spending noting the sharp increase in appropriations funding that occurred
during the period between 1880 and 1920 when many committees performed both functions. 102
The idea, however, merits greater scrutiny, because the congressional budget process has
changed significantly in the last 40 years. Following enactment of the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, a budgetary framework is in place that caps, to a certain
extent, allocations to committees and subcommittees charged with discretionary spending.
Today, it is more likely that discretionary spending would be restrained under a committee
regime that combines the authorization/appropriation functions, particularly if the Budget
Committees are given more power.

Rather than bold statutory changes, other critics of the appropriations process favor
amending House and Senate rules by closing procedural loopholes or instituting selfenforcement mechanisms. These efforts have been met with limited success, although modest
changes to the rules have been adopted with respect to earmarks. For example, in 2006, Senator
John McCain, a long time critic of the appropriations process, introduced S. 2265 which would
have strengthened Rule XVI to further discourage authorization riders in appropriations bills or
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reports. 103 The McCain proposal would allow a 60-vote point of order to be raised against
specific provisions that contain unauthorized appropriations, including but not limited to
earmarks, as well as unauthorized policy changes in appropriations bills and conference
reports. 104 S. 2265 would also require that conference reports be available at least 48 hours prior
to floor consideration. 105 Although the McCain bill languished in Committee during the 110th
Congress, the limited scope of the proposal should form the basis for incremental reform that is
less likely to directly challenge the current political imbalance between appropriators and
authorizers.

IV. Recommendations for Incremental Reform

Recent attempts to reform the appropriations process, and indirectly the authorization
process, have failed in large measure because of institutional inertia. Appropriators control the
purse strings and can leverage funding for federal programs and individual Member earmark
requests. In return, Members of the Appropriations Committees are assured that serious attempts
to reform the system will falter. Because of these political dynamics, current attempts to bring
meaningful reform are doomed to fail. No where is this more apparent that in the area of
earmarks. Representative Floyd Flake and Senator John McCain have repeatedly sought
enactment of reforms that would, by all accounts, wrest control over earmarks from the
Appropriations Committees. 106 Each attempt has been met by resistance from not only
appropriators but also other Members who rely on the generosity of appropriators for pet
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projects. It is clear that bold initiatives to reform the authorization process will suffer a similar
fate.

Serious recommendations to reform the authorization/appropriations framework need to
recognize the institutional and political dynamics of the current system. Reform must begin with
term limits for appropriators that include a mechanism for grandfathering in current members of
the appropriations committees. In addition, the appropriations process must be rendered more
transparent subjecting appropriations bills and report language to public scrutiny. A
grandfathering provision in connection with term limits would sufficiently safeguard the interests
of current Members of the Appropriations Committees. Efforts to create a more transparent and
accountable appropriations process would be difficult to oppose. Transparency is a fundamental
tenet in a modern democracy and has generally been met with little resistance in the area of
earmarks.

Should a time come when more substantive reform is politically necessary or even
palatable, proposals should strengthen House and Senate procedural rules and provide the House
and Senate Budget Committee with greater responsibilities over the budget process. Although
such reforms seem unlikely today, there may come a time when public perception of the
appropriations process compels Members of Congress, perhaps even appropriators, to take
affirmative action to fix the process. The time for bold reform may come sooner rather than
later. Several Members of the Appropriations Committee have recently been the subject of
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Federal investigations for allegedly taking advantage of their positions. 107 One is in jail for
abusing his appropriations committee responsibilities.108 Another was convicted in December,
2008, although the charges were later dropped under allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. 109
These very public investigations and criminal cases may lead to substantive and long-term
changes to the appropriations process. These reforms would also ensure that the distinction
between authorizations and appropriations is substantive rather than a mere procedural formality.

A. Challenging the Power of Appropriators - Term Limits for Appropriators

As a first step to reform, critics must recognize that appropriators have little incentive to
change the current process. Once a Member of Congress is selected to serve on the
Appropriations Committee, tenure is only limited by a loss in the general election, retirement or
death. Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) has served on the committee for a remarkable 50 years.
Before leaving the Senate, former Chairman Ted Stevens (R-AK) had served for nearly 30 years.
The numbers are similar in the House as evidenced by Congressman Jamie Whitten’s 40 year
rein as an appropriations subcommittee chair. Ideally, in a democratic institution, membership
on a particularly powerful committee should be available to a wide array of Members and
constituencies. Unfortunately, only a select few are chosen to serve on the Appropriations
Committees and their tenure is secured until they leave Congress.
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Term limits for appropriators would downgrade the importance of seniority on the
committee and limit the effective control held by the cardinals in favor of a more meritocratic
system of choosing short-term committee leaders. It would encourage members to vote on
principle rather than in line with long-term committee interests. With the knowledge that a stint
on the appropriations committee would be followed by tenure on an authorizing committee,
appropriators might be more likely to defer legislative matters to the appropriate authorizing
committee. In addition, term limits would introduce a periodic influx of new ideas in the
appropriations process and likely reduce the entrenched power of the committee staff and
bureaucracy. It may, in the long-term, even lead to reduced discretionary spending as Members
begin to view Committee service as a temporary stop in a congressional career.

Most importantly, under a regime of term limits, appropriators would no longer have the
institutional incentive to oppose more drastic reforms to the appropriations process. Of course,
current members of the Appropriations Committees are not likely to support term limits unless
the rules do not apply to their service. For this reason, any proposal to limit the terms of
appropriators should grandfather in current members. It should align the length of committee
service with the constitutional terms of Senate and House Members. In the House, service on the
Appropriations Committee should be limited to three terms to allow Members to gain some
expertise in the appropriations process, affecting only two election cycles. Senate terms should
be limited to eight years reflecting the six year election cycle. While a grandfathering provision
will not solve the near-term problems in the appropriations process, it is the most acceptable
method for introducing long-term comprehensive reform. (Specific language amending House
and Senate rules to incorporate terms limits for appropriators is included as Attachment A)
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B. Increased Accountability and Transparency

Efforts to bring accountability and sunlight to the appropriations process have been met
with some success in recent years, most notably in the area of earmarks. During the 110th
Congress, the House adopted rules requiring the identification of earmarks and their sponsors
before legislation can be considered and imposing other restrictions. 110 The Senate recently
followed suit adopting, as part of an ethics reform package, earmark reform provisions including
the requirement that earmarks be identified prior to consideration and that their sponsors be
publicly identified. 111 These reforms, while modest, have resulted in greater scrutiny of not just
earmarks but of the appropriations process in general.

However, more reform is needed. Successful attempts to bring sunlight to the
earmarking process should be broadened to include other aspects of the appropriations process.
In the Senate, Rule XVI should be amended to require that appropriations bills including
accompanying reports be available on-line at least 48 hours before the Senate votes on a motion
to proceed with the appropriations bill. A similar amendment to House Rule XXI should be
adopted to ensure that House appropriations bills are subject to the same public scrutiny. These
reforms should be relatively non-controversial, yet effective in calling attention to legislative
riders, earmarks, and unauthorized appropriations. As Justice Louis Brandeis once stated,
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“sunlight is the best disinfectant; electric light the best policeman.” 112 (Specific language
amending House and Senate rules to ensure public access to the text of appropriations bills is
included as Attachment B)

C. Strengthening Senate and House Points of Order

More substantive reforms could be implemented at the Committee level through
modifications to Appropriations Committee rules of procedure including making appropriations
bills and reports available to committee members and the public at least 48 hours prior to
subcommittee consideration, prohibiting policy riders or unauthorized appropriations in the
appropriations bill or report, and permitting, as a right, the consideration of amendments to the
non-binding report. However, even with term limits, it is unlikely a committee or subcommittee
chair would support changes to committee rules that limit his or her discretion.

Reform should therefore take the form of amendments to House and Senate procedures
that are subject to a vote of the full House or Senate rather than the whim of an Appropriations
Committee Chair. Specific reforms to House and Senate rules should be modeled on a proposal
introduced by Senator McCain in 2006. 113 Any member should be permitted to raise a point of
order against specific provisions in either the appropriations text or the accompanying report that
either include unauthorized appropriations or encompass purely policy matters. Current
loopholes in House and Senate rules should be closed.
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Senate Rule XVI broadly covers unauthorized appropriations and policy riders. In its
scope, the Rule has greater applicability than its House counterpart which does not cover
continuing resolutions. However, Rule XVI contains some notable exceptions which should be
addressed. Rule XVI’s scope should be broadened to cover Senate appropriations measures in
general. It should apply to conference reports as well as to all provisions contained in
appropriations bills whether adopted in the Chairman’s draft, included as a Committee
amendment or as a floor amendment. With respect to unauthorized appropriations, the Rule
should prohibit appropriations unless there is an authorization in law. Current rules permit
appropriations for authorizations previously passed by the Senate in the same legislative
session. 114 Recognizing that there may sometimes be a need to include unauthorized
appropriations or legislative riders in an appropriations bill, the proposed amendment provides
for a waiver of the Rule with the affirmative vote of three fifths of Senators.

Similar language should be adopted in the House to prohibit unauthorized appropriations
and legislation in all appropriations bills and supplemental appropriations measures including
continuing resolutions. 115 Prospects for further reform in the House are more problematic. Rule
XXI may be bypassed through adoption by the Rules Committee of a rule waiving all points of
order to appropriations bills or the appropriations conference reports. 116 Without the ability to
waive or limit objections on the House floor, the appropriations process would likely become
bogged down in a myriad of procedural disputes. However, if Senate rules are enforced,
particularly if they apply to conference agreements, and the concerns regarding report language
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are addressed, there is little need to further modify House rules. (Proposed changes to House and
Senate Rules based on legislation introduced by Senator McCain are included in Attachment C)

D. Limiting the Scope of Report Language

On the statutory front, legislation should be introduced which prohibits agency obligation
of funds for earmarks and programs not included in the appropriations text. Given that most
earmarks are contained in non-binding reports, this proposal would require agencies to disregard
earmarks that have not been fully vetted through the legislative process. As an alternative, the
President could direct, through the issuance of an Executive Order, agencies to disregard
earmarks or unauthorized appropriations contained solely in report language. Because Presidents
have declined to exercise such authority, a statutory amendment is necessary to require that
unauthorized appropriations, particularly earmarks, are included in the text of appropriations
bills. (Proposed legislative text, based on proposals by Senator McCain, is included as
Attachment D)

C. Granting Budget Committees Greater Appropriations Oversight Functions

Our Founding Fathers recognized the importance of the separation and devolution of
power in government. 117 For this reason, the Constitution spreads authority over governmental
functions across three branches of government. In Congress, the Senate and the House share
power, often uncomfortably, over legislative activities. The same theory of government should
117
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apply to the appropriations process. As an alternative to increased transparency and
accountability, policy makers should consider giving another committee added statutory
responsibilities to counterbalance the modern consolidation of power in the hands of
appropriators. The Budget Committees could effectively serve this role.

Two budget reforms should be considered. First, a joint budget resolution that has the
force of law should be adopted. Under the Congressional Budget Act, the concurrent budget
resolution does not carry the force of law. Although appropriators typically abide by the budget
resolution, they are free to disregard its spending allocations. A statutory budget resolution
would require appropriations and budget committee members to negotiate spending levels. In
addition, under current law and rules, the budget resolution is broken down by function which
can easily be manipulated and modified by the Appropriations Committees. The Budget
Committee should have authority to divide spending allocations by appropriations subcommittee
rather than by functional categories.

Although neither of these reforms directly address unauthorized appropriations, report
language or policy riders, they provide the Budget Committee with just enough power relative to
appropriators to foster meaningful discussion of topics not necessarily related to spending caps.
Power over the appropriations process would truly be shared by two committees with the Budget
Committee in a better position to protect the jurisdictional boundaries of authorizing committees.
It is likely, for instance, that negotiations on spending levels for a particular appropriations
subcommittee would engender a discussion of earmarks and unauthorized appropriations. While
the Budget Committee would have the responsibility for setting overall mandatory funding levels
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for subcommittees, final decisions on specific programs and report language would still fall
within the sole purview of the Appropriations Committee. (Proposed amendments to the
Congressional Budget Act are listed in Attachment E. Complicated language providing the
Budget Resolution with the force of law is deemed beyond the scope of this paper).

V. Conclusion

Over the last forty years, the distinction between authorizing legislation and
appropriations has become blurred as the Senate and House Appropriations Committees have
increasingly encroached on territory traditionally reserved to the authorizing committees. The
encroachment has been most notable in the area of unauthorized appropriations, policy riders,
earmarks and report language. Reforms are needed to ensure that legislative topics are debated
and decided by committees with jurisdictional expertise, to lessen the dangers commensurate
with the accumulation of power in a select few, and to regain the public trust. The
recommendations contained in this paper may, at first, appear rather modest. However, reforms
should not obliterate the important role of the appropriations committee in the performance its
constitutional duties, but must reassert the distinction between appropriations and authorizations.
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Term Limits for Appropriators
(Attachment A)
Amend Rule X of the Rules of the House with a new clause 5(c)(2):
A Member of the Appropriations Committee may not serve on the Appropriations Committee or
any of its subcommittees during more than three consecutive Congresses (disregarding for this
purpose any service for less than a full session of Congress). Members serving on the
Appropriations Committee as of the date this resolution is adopted shall not be subject to the
requirements of this subsection.
Amend Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate with a new subsection 3(h):
No Senator who is a member the Appropriations Committee may serve on the Appropriations
Committee or any of its subcommittees during more than four consecutive Congresses
(disregarding for this purpose any service for less than a full session of Congress). Members
serving on the Appropriations Committee as of the date this resolution is adopted shall not be
subject to the requirements of this subsection.
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Increasing Transparency and Accountability
(Attachment B)
Amend Rule XXI of the House with a new clause 11:
(11)It shall not be in order to consider on the House floor any general appropriations bill
or conference report unless the bill and the accompanying committee or conference report has
been available on a publicly accessible website in searchable format at least 48 hours before
consideration on the House floor.
Amend Rule XVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate a new Clause 12:
(12) It shall not be in order to vote on a motion to proceed to consider a general
appropriations bill or conference report, unless the bill and the accompanying committee or
conference report has been available on a publicly accessible website in searchable format at
least 48 hours before such vote.
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Strengthening House and Senate Appropriations Procedural Rules
(Modeled after S. 2245 sponsored by Sen. McCain in the 109th Congress)
(Attachment C)
Amend Rule XXI of the House with a new clause 12:
(12)For purposes of this section, the term “general appropriations” shall include but not
be limited to annual appropriations acts, continuing resolutions and supplemental
appropriations acts.
Amend Rule XXVI of the Senate with a new clause 9, clause 10 and clause 11:
(9) No new or general legislation nor any unauthorized appropriation may be included in
any appropriations bill. No new or general legislation nor any unauthorized appropriation, new
matter, or nongermane matter may be included in any conference report on a general
appropriation bill.
(10) A point of order under clause (9) may be waived only by a motion agreed to by the
affirmative vote of three-fifths of the Senators duly chosen and sworn. If an appeal is taken from
the ruling of the Presiding Officer with respect to such a point of order, the ruling of the
Presiding Officer shall be sustained absent an affirmative vote of three-fifths of the Senators duly
chosen and sworn.
(11) If a point of order under clause (9) against a Senate bill is sustained, then-(A) the affected provision shall be struck from the bill; and
(B) any modification of total amounts appropriated necessary to reflect the
deletion of the matter struck from the bill shall be made and the allocation of
discretionary budgetary resources allocated under section 302(a)(2) of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 shall be reduced accordingly.
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Limiting the Scope of Report Language
(Modeled after S. 2245 sponsored by Sen. McCain in the 109th Congress)
(Attachment D)
Proposed Legislation
(a) No federal agency may obligate any funds made in an appropriation act to implement
an earmark or unauthorized appropriation that is included in a congressional report
accompanying the appropriation Act, unless the earmark or unauthorized appropriation, is also
included in the appropriation Act.
(b) Definitions – For purposes of this section:
(1) The term ‘earmark’ means a provision that specifies the identity of an entity,
not including a Federal agency, to receive assistance and the amount of the
assistance.
(2) The term ‘unauthorized appropriations’ means an appropriation-(i) not specifically authorized by law; or
(ii) the amount of which exceeds the amount specifically authorized by law
to be appropriated.
(3) The term ‘congressional report’ means a report of the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives or the Senate, or a joint
explanatory statement of a committee of conference.
(4) The term ‘appropriation act’ includes annual appropriations acts, continuing
resolutions and supplemental appropriations acts.
(c) Effective Date: This section shall apply to all appropriations acts enacted after
enactment of this bill.
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Amendments to the Congressional Budget Act of 1974
(Attachment E)
Amend Section 302(a) with the following:
(1) Strike in section 302(a)(3)(A) “In the Senate, the amount allocated to the Committee
on Appropriations shall be further divided among the categories specified in section 250(c)(4) of
the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985” and insert “In the Senate, the
amount allocated to the Committee on Appropriations shall be further divided among the
Subcommittees of the Appropriations Committee”
(2) Strike in section 302(a)(3)(B)(ii) “consistent with the categories specified
in section 250(c)(4) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985” and
insert “among the Subcommittees of the Appropriations Committee.”
(3) Strike section 302(b) and redesignate ensuing sections as necessary.
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